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Abstract
In this paper we study a duopoly where the network e¤ect is nonmonotone and the
network can be overloaded. The rms choose prices and locations endogenously, and
the agents utility is inuenced by the number of people patronizing the same rm
she does. We determine the market equilibrium, and we study how the network e¤ect
inuences social welfare. We compare this setting with the standard horizontal di¤er-
entiation model with no network e¤ects to understand whether and how conformism is
socially desirable. The results show that whether network e¤ects are desirable depends
on how people are conformist, and whether overloading is feasible. If overloading is
not possible (in either of the rms network), and the total consumersmass is suf-
ciently high, a network e¤ect which is slightly concave increases social welfare. By
contrast, if overloading is feasible, and the total consumersmass is su¢ ciently small,
social welfare is increased if the network e¤ect is more concave than in the previous
case.
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cation: L14, D62.
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1 Introduction
Yesterday evening I met some friends for a pub crawl in London. We rst went to George
IV, the pub of the university, but it was crowded, with many people standing outside. We
thus decided to go to the Ship Tavern, which is the closest. Once entered the pub, we
realized that it was almost empty. Finally, even though it was a little farer away from
the university, we moved to the Shakespeares Head, on Kingsway, where we found a fair
amount of customers, and sat and drunk our drinks.
This little narrative entails the main ingredients of this paper: the nonmonotonicity
of network e¤ects, the distance of goods, and the positioning of retailers. As the story
suggests, network e¤ects are not always increasing in the number of people participating
in the network. Casual observation suggests that people prefer a fair amount of the others
sharing a place, or exhibiting the consumption of a good. This fact can be noticed also
in the market for fashion products: you may want neither to be the only weird person
wearing a kind of clothes nor that everyone dresses like you.1
Excessive crowding could moreover generate disutility as well as a standard overloaded
network, or tra¢ c jam. The marketing literature has shown extensive evidence about how
retail crowding a¤ects consumers behavior (e.g. Eroglu and Harrell, 1986; Eroglu et
al. 2005). Individuals vary in their tolerance to crowding and excessive crowding can
decrease hedonic utility or generate disutility. Nevertheless, crowding tolerance does not
only depend on individual factors, but also has cultural roots which make the average level
of crowding tolerance di¤ering across cultures.2 For example, Kaya and Weber (2003)
study a sample of American and Turkish students, showing that the Turkish students
have a higher perception of crowding with respect to the Americans. Pons and Laroche
(2007) study a sample of Canadian and Mexican students and nd that the perceived level
of crowding in the same situation is on average higher among the Mexican students. In
an analogous study, Pons et al. (2006) nd that Lebanese studentsaverage perception
of crowding is higher than Canadian students. These di¤erences can be explained by
national cultural dimensions, such as the degree of individualism, i.e. the extent to which
1For an explanation of this phenomenon in terms of signalling see Pesendorfer (1995), considering
fashion cycles.
2Tabellini (2008) observes that in the economic literature the notion of culture has been dened in
di¤erent ways as: a) a selection mechanism among multiple equilibria or in repeated interactions; b) the
set of beliefs manipulated by earlier generations regarding the consequences of the individuals actions; c)
primitives values and individual preferences. Guiso et al. (2006) suggest that, whichever the denition,
the identication of the cultural inuence should exploit those aspects not changing along the individuals
life and typically inherited from generation to generation.
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people are expected to look after only themselves or the closest relatives. On the basis
of the work by Hofstede (2001)3, America and Canada score high in individualism, while
Mexico, Turkey, and Lebanon score low. Mooij and Hofestede (2002) hypotize that, more
in general, converging of technology and income will lead to heterogeneity in consumer
behavior based on cultural di¤erences, with relevant implications for social welfare.
For these reasons, the aim of this paper is to understand whether and how the shape
of network e¤ects inuence social welfare. While casual observation is conrmed by the
evidence shown above, the majority of research on network e¤ects and externalities has
concentrated on monotonicity. We thus focus on network e¤ects which are nonmonotone
in the number of people consuming a good at the same location (in a dimension of the
product). We introduce moreover the possibility for overloading.
We consider a duopoly where the rms can choose prices and locations, and where
the utility of a consumer is inuenced by the number of people patronizing the same
rm. We determine the market equilibrium and the incentives for each rm to undercut
the rival both at the price stage and at the location stage. We then proceed to study
how the network e¤ect inuences social welfare, and the role played by its concavity,
nonmonotonicity, and the possibility of overloading. Finally, we compare this setting with
the standard horizontal di¤erentiation model to understand when conformism is socially
desirable.
We nd that the rms have no incentives to undercut at the price stage, while at the
location stage there are incentives for displacing the location to capture the rivals market.
The introduction of nonmonotonicity and overloading thus imposes further conditions on
the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium can
exist either at the increasing or at the decreasing part of the network e¤ect, or both. It
can also exist when the network is overloaded. We moreover show that the overloading
of the network raises prices and thus has anti-competitive e¤ects. We observe that the
endogenous determination of the locations allows the rms to di¤erentiate only horizon-
tally. This suggests that the choice of di¤erentiating vertically by rms should entail some
rigidity in the location choice of the rms.
Comparing the social welfare in the case with network e¤ects to the case in which they
3The most widely used measurements of culture across the social sciences are the Hofstedes dimensions.
The Hofstedes book is one the most quoted in the Social Science Citation Index, but, surprisingly, it is little
known among the economists. Hofstede (2001) proposes four dimensions of national culture: individualism
(IDV), power distance (PDI), uncertainty aversion (UAI), and masculinity (MAS). They are based on
117000 questionnaires surveyed in the period 1967 1973 at the IBM Corporation, with 88000 employees
responding, across 72 countries and 20 languages. They are stable across years, as numerous studies have
subsequently validated them, and they exhibit a high degree of correlation with competing frameworks.
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are absent, we nd that the rmsprots are increasing in the network e¤ects only if the
network can be overloaded. The consumerssurplus is decreasing in the concavity of the
network e¤ect, while by contrast prots are increasing. The results show that whether
network e¤ects are socially desirable depends on how people are conformist, and whether
overloading is feasible. If overloading is not possible (in either of the rmsnetwork), and
the total consumersmass is su¢ ciently high, a network e¤ect which is slightly concave
increases social welfare. By contrast, if overloading is feasible, and the total consumers
mass is su¢ ciently small, social welfare is increased if the network e¤ect is more concave
than in the previous case.
We extend the existing literature along the following lines: in this paper the network
e¤ect can be nonmonotonic and negative; it does not depend directly on the total size of
the network, but only on the size of consumers patronizing the same store; nally, the net-
work can be overloaded. Pesendorfer (1995) proposes a model of fashion cycles, where the
consumersutility displays nonmonotonic features similar to those adopted in this paper.
He gives the conditions under which the consumers could be better o¤ by banning fashion.
Our approach is di¤erent from Pesendorfers since we do not rely on signalling arguments,
and we do not focus explicitly on fashion goods, even though our model could be applied
to the fashion market. Nevertheless we share Pesendorfers interest in the welfare analysis
of exclusivist-conformist e¤ects. Yang and Barrett (2002) study a continuous time opti-
mization model considering a monopoly characterized by nonconcave and nonmonotonic
network externalities. Their model di¤ers from ours since strategic considerations are
absent, and they do not study neither the case of overloaded networks, nor social wel-
fare. Lambertini and Orsini (2005) study the existence of the equilibrium in a duopoly
with Bertrand competition and endogenous choice of the locations. In their framework
the network externality can be only monotone increasing, and the welfare analysis is not
explicitly performed. We extend their contribution allowing it for nonmonotonicity and
overloading. Our paper also relates to Grilo et al. (2001), who studies as well a duopoly
with Bertrand competition, but with exogenously given locations of the rms. Even if they
allow the network e¤ect to be nonmonotone, in fact they focus on the role played by the
total size of the network in the market equilibrium and mostly on the case of monotonic
externalities, without considering the possibility for overloading. Our paper generalizes
the functional form of the network externality adopted in their paper, and focuses on
the role played by the number of people patronizing the same store.4 Moreover, in our
paper the rms locate endogenously, and we perform welfare analysis studying when the
4Of course, the total mass of consumers is going to play as well an important role in the determinants
of the equilibrium and of social welfare.
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network e¤ects are benecial. Finally, Grilo and Friedman (2005) consider a circular city
model where consumers care about the othersidentity. They study the optimal number
of rms entering the market, and compare the case in which the network e¤ect depends on
consumersidentity with the case in which consumers are anonymous. Here we focus on
anonimous consumers who care only about the number of people patronizing their store,
we consider a standard di¤erentiation model with quadratic transportation costs, and our
welfare analysis targets the role of network e¤ects on social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we present the duopoly
sequential game and study the existence of an equilibrium. In section 3 we perform the
social welfare analysis and we discuss the desirability of conformism, and in the last section
we provide conclusions and directions for future research.
2 The model
Consider two rms, A and B, whose locations are xA and xB; where xi; i = A;B belongs
to the compact subset [x; x]  R. They sell at price pi; have no production costs, and their
locations are determined endogenously. The consumers are uniformly distributed over the
interval [0; 1] and n is their total mass. A consumers indirect utility function is given by
Ui = K   pi   t(x  xi)2 + E(ni);
where K is the gross utility from consumption; t(x   xi)2 is the total trasportation
cost, where x 2 [0; 1] is the location of the consumer and t > 0 is the unit transportation
cost; ni is the number of consumers patronizing store i; such that
X
i
ni = n. The last
term represents the network e¤ect function. Analogously to Grilo et al. (2001), we dene
it as follows:
E(ni) = ni   n2i ; (1)
and throughout the paper we will assume that ;   0:5 Notice that the network e¤ect
depends only on the number of consumers buying from the rm i, and not on the total mass
of consumers. The network e¤ect function is depicted in Figure 1. When the consumers
mass n is lower than =2; it is clear that the individuals can face only an increasing
network e¤ect. By contrast, if n > =2 the function can be nonmonotone. We will exploit
5We thus assume that the function is always concave. Considering the possibility for convexity could
be a useful extension of this paper. For a case in which the externality function is convex, see Yang and
Barret (2002).
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Figure 1: The network e¤ect function
this fact to explore the role of monotonicity in this environment. The "OverLoading"
threshold is nOL 6, over which the excessive crowding of the market generates disutility.7
The model reduces to a standard positional (or status) goods model setting  = 0, to
a standard linear network e¤ect model setting  = 0. The comparison with the case in
which the network e¤ect is absent can be easily obtained by setting  =  = 0:
The market is modelled as a two stage game, where in the rst stage the rms choose
their locations over the interval [x; x]  R, and in the second stage choose prices. The
6 It can be alternatively thought as congestion, or a vanity e¤ect. Grilo et al. (2005) give two denitions
in the same paper for vanity. The rst is given by considering only the externality E(ni), and it says that
vanity is displayed in consumer behavior when  < 0; because consumers are always worse o¤ when the
size is increasing. This is true, but incomplete, since as noticed in the text, E(ni) can be negative also
with  > 0 and ni > =: In the same paper Grilo et al. (2005) state as well that consumers preferences
display vanity or conformity depending on whether the value of the externality is lower or greater than the
transportation costs. Yang and Barret (2002) tribute the nonmonotonic shape of the network externality
to the sum of a functionality e¤ect and an exclusivity e¤ect.
7The possibility for overloading was allowed also in Grilo et al. (2005), Young and Barret (2002), but
the two papers nevertheless do not consider overloading (Grilo et al. limit the analysis to ni < =2;
with brief considerations in the conclusions for the other case, and Young and Barret leave it for future
extensions).
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equilibrium is derived by backward induction as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.8 We proceed to derive the solution of the second stage of the game.
2.1 Undercutting incentives and price stage
We denote with bx the position of the consumer indi¤erent between buying from A or B.
Her position can be derived by setting UA(bx) = UB(bx); and by satisfying the condition
nA = bxn and nB = (1  bx)n . Then the indi¤erent consumer is given by:
bx = pA   pB + t(x2B   x2A)  n+ n2
2[t(xB   xA)  n+ n2] : (2)
Focusing on the case of an interior equilibrium, the two rms maximize the prot i = pini
choosing the price level. The solution for the prices at this stage is given by
pA =
t
3
(xB   xA)(2 + xB + xA)  n+ n2 (3)
pB =
t
3
(xB   xA)(4  xB   xA)  n+ n2: (4)
Notice that whenever n > nOL; that is the total size of the market allows at least one
of the rms network to be overloaded, rms increase prices with respect to the standard
case where  =  = 0. This leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If the total network size allows at least one of the rms network to be
overloaded, the network e¤ect is anti-competitive.
Any of the two rms can have incentives, provided that the other is playing pi; to
capture the whole market by undercutting the price. In the following Lemma we check
that in fact an equilibrium in prices does exist.
Lemma 1 Undercutting at the price stage is never protable.
Proof. The two rms are symmetric, we will thus provide the proof only for rm As
incentives to undercut. Firm A considers (4) as given, and to undercut sells at a price
such that
bx(pA) = 6n(  n) + 3pA + 2t(xA   xB)(2 + xA + xB)
6[n(  n) + t(x   x)] = 1:
8We limit ourselves to pure strategies and concave prot functions. When the pure-strategy equilibrium
does not exist, a mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists in a nite strategic-form game. (see e.g. Nash,
1950; Osborne and Pitchik, 1987).
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Solved for pA and inserting into rm As prots gives
cA =  
2
3
t(xA   xB)(xA + xB   1)
i.e. rm As undercutting prots, which are positive if and only if either xA > xB
^xB < 1=2 ^ xA + xB < 1; or xB > 1=2 ^ xA < xB ^ xA + xB > 1: Let A be the
equilibrium prots, then undercutting is protable if and only if A  cA < 0; that is
n[t(xA   xB)(xA + xB   4)  3(n  n2)]2
18[t(xB   xA)  (n  n2)] < 0;
which is never veried for any of the relevant values of the locations and of the para-
meters. The proof of the theorem for rm Bs can be analogously obtained by inverting
the indexes.
The equilibrium prices at the price stage are thus pA and p

B. What follows takes into
account the conditions for positive prices. In the next subsection we proceed to derive the
condition for the existence of the equilibrium and the endogenous location choices of the
rms.
2.2 The existence of an equilibrium and the location stage
We rst study the conditions for a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies to exist.
We then derive the candidates for the optimal locations, conning ourselves to the case
of concave prot functions, and study whether there are any undercutting incentives to
change the locations. Finally, we study the characteristics of the equilibrium.
Inserting pi into the prot functions, i(xA; xB) depends only on the rmslocations.
Considering the symmetry of the two rms, the second order conditions (SOCs henceforth)
are given by
@2i
@2x2i
< 0: (5)
The condition for (5) to be veried are stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 @
2i
@2x2i
< 0 if and only if the conditions of either of the following cases are
satised:
1. 0 < n  22 ^ n  n2 > 32 t;
2. 
2
2 < n <
2
 ^ (n  n2 < 98 t _ n  n2 > 32 t);
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3. n  2 :
The proof is in the Appendix.
Lets now consider the solution of the location stage. Deriving the rst order condi-
tions, solving for xA and xB gives ve critical points. The only candidate equilibrium such
that the SOCs are veried is at the locations xA =  14 and xB = 54 ; which are consistent
with the results in the previous literature on product di¤erentiation.9
The nonmonotonic network e¤ects introduce conditions on the positivity of prots, as
stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider the two locations xA =  14 and xB = 54 : The rmsprots
i =
3
4
nt  n
2
(n  n2); (6)
are positive if and only if either:
1. 0 < n  32 t;
2. n > 32 t ^n  n2 < 32 t;
for any ; ; n; t > 0:
The proof is in the Appendix. Note that the rst term of (6) represents the prots of
the rms absent the network e¤ect. The second part thus represents the component of the
prots that is owed to the presence of the e¤ects. If the term in brackets is positive, the
network e¤ect a¤ects negatively the prots of the rms. In other words, prots decrease if
the network e¤ect is su¢ ciently low so as not to allow for overloading even if all consumers
would be served by the same rm.
At ( 14 ; 54) the equilibrium prices are pi = 32 t E(n): As long as E(n) < 32 t; the prices
are thus above the marginal costs (here set equal to zero). Therefore, at the location
stage each rm may displace its location so as to undercut the rival and capture the whole
market. The following Lemma states the conditions under which this may happen.
Lemma 4 At the two locations xA =  14 and xB = 54 ; rm A monopolizes the market by
displacing its location if and only if
n  3
2
t ^ 5
6
t  n  n2 < 3
2
t: (7)
9The equilibrium locations of the rms are outside the extremes of the consumerspositions, and are
the same of those in the game without network e¤ects. What is interesting is that the existence of an
externality does not inuence the strategic choice of the rms, see also Lambertini and Orsini (2005).
9
Proof. The setting is symmetric as in the undercutting price case. We thus consider
the possibility for rm A to displace its location, given xB = 54 : Thus we solve for which
location bx(xA; 54) = 1; which gives
x
0
A =
1
2
  [48t (n  n
2) + 9t2]
1
2
4t
; x
00
A =
1
2
+
[48t (n  n2) + 9t2] 12
4t
(8)
This means that the locations of rm A such that all the consumers buy from A are
symmetrical with respect to the centre of the location interval. We thus study the incentive
to undercut B when xA = x
0
A: In this case, the prots from displacement are given by:
disA =
n[48t (n  n2) + 9t2] 12
2
  2n(n  n2)  3
2
nt: (9)
Firm As displacement prots are positive if and only if 0 < n <  and n n2 < 3t2 ;
i.e. if the network e¤ect evaluated at the total size is not overloading, and the level of the
externality is su¢ ciently low. The prots for rm A at the (xA =  14 , xB = 54) equilibrium
are given by
A =
n(n  n2)
2
  3
4
nt (10)
and they are positive, according to Lemma 3, if and only if n > 32 t ^ n  n2 < 32 t;
or always when 0 < n < 32 t. Lets call 4 = disA   A: Firm A has an incentive to
displace its location and capture the rivals share whenever 4 > 0: Taking into account
the conditions disA > 0 and A > 0, this happens if and only if either of the following
holds:
1. 56 t < n <
3
2 t ^ (n  n2) > 56 t;
2. n  32 t ^ 56 t  (n  n2) < 32 t:
The rst can be ruled out by checking the SOCs.
Considering jointly Lemmata 1 - 4, in the following proposition we state the main
result of this section.
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Proposition 2 The two locations xA =  14 and xB = 54 are the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of the game in pure strategies if and only if either of the following holds:
1. n  n2 > 32 t^  ( 6t)
2
2 < n <
3t
2 ;
2. n  n2 < 56 t ^ n > 3+
p
3(3 10t) 12
4 ;
and no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists otherwise.
Proof. The proof is readily obtained by merging the conditions of Lemmas 2 - 4. Lets
rst consider the monotonic increasing part of E(n), i.e. when n < 2 : By Lemma 1,
the SOCs hold only if E(n) > 32 t; which implies
 ( 6t)2
2 < n; by Lemma 2 prots are
positive for both rms if 0 < n  32 t; i.e. 0 < n  3t2 : Thus, joining the two inequalities
we get  ( 6t)
2
2 < n  3t2 ; which leads to the rst part of the proposition. Notice that
by Lemma 4 in this range of n no undercutting incentives are at work, and of course if
t > 
2
3 no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
Consider now the monotonic decreasing part of E(n). By Lemma 2, if n >  the
SOCs are always met in the relevant range of the parameters. By Lemma 3 the positive
protscondition hold, since E(n) < 0: Finally, by Lemma 4 there are no incentives for
displacement in this region. Lets now consider the case in which 2 < n <

 : In this
region, SOCs require E(n) < 32 t and prots positivity is obtained if E(n) <
9
8 t: The
latter is a more stringent condition. Nevertheless, by Lemma 4 in this region incentives
for displacement are at work if 56 t  E(n) < 32 t, thus a subgame perfect equilibrium exists
only for E(n) < 56 t; which corresponds to n >
3+
p
3(3 10t) 12
4 :This provides the second
part of the Proposition.
The intuition for the proposition is represented in Figures 2-3, which show four possible
cases emerging. Remember that the gure represents the conditions on the total size of
the network, but the parameters are determined by the network e¤ect on consumers
preferences for the number of people patronizing the same store.
In Figure 2 the total network size can be greater than =, i.e. there is the possibility
for overloading. Consider A: the parabola represents the network e¤ect evaluated at n,
while the straight line is the linear positive component of it, which obviously cuts it in
its maximum. The shadowed areas represent the locus where an equilibrium in pure
strategies exists. On the right part of the parabola, the dashed area represents the part
of the existence locus which is eroded by incentives to displace.
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Figure 2: Overloading is feasible.
In this case an equilibrium exists both on the increasing side and on the decreasing size
of the network e¤ect. Consider now gure B: when the transportation cost is su¢ ciently
high (that is when 3/2 of it are greater than the maximum value of the network e¤ect),
the equilibrium does not exist any more on the left side of the parabola. On the contrary,
on the right side both the undercutting and the equilibrium spaces are increased. In both
case A and case B notice that an equilibrium may exist as well in the overloading area10.
Lets now consider in Figure 3 the case in which the total network size is such that
overloading is impossible. In this case, the equilibrium does not exist anymore on the right
side of the parabola. It is thus striking that the existence of the equilibrium in that area
depends on the possibility for overloading. Figure 3C shows that an equilibrium can exist
on the increasing side of the network e¤ect if the transportation rate is su¢ ciently low (as
in gure 2A). When this is not veried, gure 3D shows the case in which no equilibrium
exists.
A further comment on the above proposition concerns the kind of di¤erentiation of
the products. As observed in Grilo et al. (2001), the di¤erentiation in the model can
be interpreted as horizontal if 0 < xA + xB < 2, and vertical if either xA + xB > 2 or
xA + xB < 0: The following Corollary thus stems directly from Proposition 1.
10As we will show in Lemma 5, the rms have unilateral incentives to deal with a market which could
be overloaded.
12
Figure 3: Overloading is not feasible.
Corollary 1 If the rms choose endogenously their locations, at the equilibrium only hor-
izontal di¤erentiation can result.
This result thus suggests that the choice of vertical di¤erentiation should be driven
by some rigidities in the location choice, so that horizontal di¤erentiation is either non-
available or does not entail a market equilibrium. We now proceed in the following section
to perform the analysis of social welfare.
3 Social welfare and conformism desirability
In this section we study how the presence of the network e¤ect inuences social welfare,
and the role played by concavity, monotonicity, and overloading. The consumers surplus
evaluated at the equilibrium values obtained in Proposition 1 is given by
13
CS =
bxZ
0
K   pA   t(x  xA)2 + nA   n2A dx+
1Z
bx
K   pB   t(x  xB)2 + nB   n2B dx
= K   13
48
t+
1
4
(2n  n2): (11)
The last term is the component of the consumers surplus deriving from the network
e¤ect. The following Lemma states when the presence of the externality positively a¤ects
CS and industry prots.
Lemma 5 The network e¤ect increases
1. consumerssurplus if and only if 0 < n <  ;
2. rmsprots if and only if n >  .
See the Appendix for the proof. An interpretation of this result is that a positive net-
work e¤ect in the utility function (which depends only on the number of people consuming
the good at the same rm) in equilibrium translates into a negative e¤ect of opposite sign
in the rmsprots, depending on the total mass. The consumerspreferences neverthe-
less determine the shape of the network e¤ect evaluated at n. The rms thus have an
inherent preference for markets in which the parameter  is low and concavity  is high.
Looking at (11) and (6), notice that the consumerssurplus is decreasing, and the prots
are increasing in the concavity of the e¤ect.
Comparing the parts of the above Lemma, it is thus clear that, for some range of
the parameters, the network e¤ect increases industry prots while decreasing consumers
surplus. This happens when the size of the market allows it for overloading in the network
patronizing either of the rms. Summing up, the net e¤ect on social welfare is ambiguous,
and there is the suspicion that the degree of concavity is crucial at determining social
welfare. Social welfare is given by the sum of the consumer surplus and industry prots,
that is:
SW = CS +
X
i = K + (
3
2
n  13
48
)t+
n
2
(1  2n) + n
4
(4n  1): (12)
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Notice that SW is increasing in  if and only if n > 14 : We now want to compare (12)
with the situation in which the e¤ect is absent, that is if  =  = 0: Social welfare with
no externality is then given by:
SWne = K + (
3
2
n  13
48
)t: (13)
The comparison of SW and SWne leads to the following Proposition, which states
under what conditions the presence of the network e¤ect increases social welfare.
Proposition 3 Let ;  > 0:
The network e¤ect increases social welfare if and only if either of the followings holds:
1. 12 < n <

 ^  < (2 4n)n 4n2 ;
2.  < n <
1
4 ^  > (2 4n)n 4n2 :
The proof is in the Appendix. The rst part of the above proposition states the
condition when the total mass of consumers does not allow for overloading. In this case,
the network e¤ect is desirable only if the mass of the population is su¢ ciently high and
the concavity of the network e¤ect is su¢ ciently small. The second part of the proposition
considers the possibility for overloading. With respect to the other case, the externality
is socially desirable only if the consumersmass is low and the concavity su¢ ciently high.
Notice, referring to Lemma 5, that the industry prots are increased by the network e¤ect
only in case 2.
Is thus conformism desirable? The above results show that the answer to this ques-
tion depends on how people are conformist. If the consumersmass does not allow for
overloading (in either of the two rms), and is su¢ ciently high, then a network e¤ect not
too much concave increases social welfare. By contrast, if the consumersmass allows for
overloading, and is su¢ ciently small, a network e¤ect more concave than in the previous
case is needed to increase social welfare.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we studied how the existence of nonmonotonic network e¤ects inuences the
welfare and the equilibrium properties of a Bertrand duopoly where the choice of locations
is endogenous. We have shown the conditions for a rm to capture the rivals share at the
location stage, and when an equilibrium in pure strategies exists. We then asked whether
and how the presence of networks e¤ects inuences social welfare, and the answer is that
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it depends on the shape of the networks e¤ect. Indeed, consumers surplus is increasing
while industry prots are decreasing in its level of concavity, thus creating ambiguity in
the overall e¤ect on social welfare. Considering social welfare, the determinants of the
results are three: the consumer mass, the possibility of overloading, and the concavity of
the network e¤ect. We found that social welfare is increased by a network e¤ect with small
concavity when the consumersmass is high and overloading is not feasible. By contrast,
when the consumersmass is low and overloading is feasible, social welfare is increased by
a network e¤ect that is highly concave.
The present work suggests that how people are conformist is an important part of the
study of network e¤ects. Nevertheless, it limits its analysis to a linear Bertrand duopoly,
and to a specic network e¤ect shape. Future research could explore a more general
framework in which the network e¤ect has a general shape, and in which the transmission
of cultural values of collectivist societies versus individualism is challenged. By contrast,
studying in detail markets with specic characteristics, such as the physical location of
retailers or of restaurants and pubs, as well as the fashion designers choices in the space
characteristics of the clothes, could provide useful insights on the determinants of social
welfare, and eventually on regulation and public policy. Finally, it is interesting noticing
that Mooij and Hofestede (2002) studying 14 di¤erent countries, without suggesting a
causal e¤ect, nd that the number of cafè per million of inhabitants is negatively correlated
with the degree of individualism. Given the existence of evidence about di¤erences in
the tolerance of crowding across cultures, an empirical study could attempt to nd how
di¤erent attitudes towards socialization marginally impacts the density and the locations
of shops and retailers.
5 Appendix
5.1 Lemma 2
Proof. The second derivative @
2A
@2x2A
= @
2B
@2x2B
with respect to locations is given by
@2i
@2x2i
=
1
9[n(  n) + t(xA   xB)]3ntf 6(
3n3   3n6) 
 t2(xA   xB)2[4n2(xA + 2xB   6) + t(xA   xB)(xA + 3xB   8)] +
+2n2t(2 + 2n2   )[xA(xA   10)  3xB(xB   4)  1
2
] +
+182n4 + 2n[2t2(xA   xB)2(xA + 2xB   6)  92n4]g:
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We then study when @
2i
@2x2i
< 0 in the relevant parameter space, that is ; ; t; n > 0
and xA; xB 2 R: Given the complexity of the SOCs, we split the parameter space of n
in three sub-intervals, which correspond to the network e¤ect function evaluated at n to
be: a) monotonic increasing (0 < n  =2), b) monotonic decreasing up to overloading
(=2 < n  =), and c) monotonic decreasing and overloaded (n > =). Thus, solving
the inequalities, @
2i
@2x2i
< 0 if and only if either:
a) 0 < n  2 ^ n  n2 > 32 t;
b) 2 < n <

 ^ (n  n2 < 98 t _ n  n2 > 32 t);
c) n   :
5.2 Lemma 3
Proof. By Lemma 1, each rms prots are given by i =  23 t(xA   xB)(xA + xB   1):
Substituting the equilibrium values xA =  14 and xB = 54 and rearranging, one gets
i =
3
4nt  n2 (n n2): The second part is the network e¤ect evaluated at the consumer
mass. In this paper we assume that ; ; n; t > 0: It is clear that, whenever the overall
network e¤ect evaluated at the consumersmass is positive (n   n2 > 0); prots are
reduced from its presence. Then, prots are positive whenever n  n2 < 3t2 . Since this
implies n < 3t2 + n
2; this is clearly veried whenever 0 < n  32 t; if n > 3t2 ; then the
it must be that n  n2 < 32 t:
5.3 Lemma 5
Proof. Part one of the Lemma can be easily checked by solving 2n n2 > 0. To prove
part 2, recall now from (6) that rmsprot are given by i = 34nt  n2 (n  n2): Then
the result is easily obtained by solving n  n2 < 0:
5.4 Proposition 2
Proof. To check when the network e¤ects are benecial we consider the di¤erenceSW =
SWN   SW = n2 (1  2n) + n4 (4n  1): Notice that the transportation rate cancels out.
Thus, whether SW 7 0 does not depend on the cost of transportation. First, SW > 0
if and only if
0 <
n
2
(1  2n) + n
4
(4n  1): (14)
Notice that for any ;  > 0; this condition is never veried if and only if and only if
1
4 < n <
1
2 : Established this point, then consider two cases, when overloading is feasible
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and when it is not feasible. In the rst case, 0 < n <  : It needs be
n
4 (4n 1) < n2 (1 2n);
that is  < (2 4n)
n 4n2 : Since  > 0; to be veried it needs that
(2 4n)
n 4n2 > 0: This is veried
either if n > 12 or if n <
1
4 ; but the second solution can be discarded since it would imply
that (14) is not veried. Analogously, in the second case, n >  (14) is veried if and only
if  > (2 4n)
n 4n2 ; which is veried if and only if either n <
1
4 or n >
1
4 , but the latter can be
discarded since (14) would be then negative.
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